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On June 26, 1993, President Clinton ordered a missile attack on Iraq's intelligence headquarters
in Baghdad. The president's approval level surged—a textbook example of a "rally." But who rallied?
Previous studies of rallies have relied on aggregate data, preventing analysts from determining who
switched from nonapproval to approval of the president in response to a rally event. The CBS News/
New York Times Poll interviewed a national sample of adults right before the attack and reinterviewed
622 of the same respondents immediately following. Employing this panel study, we find that those
who rallied were those most disposed to support the president in the first place. Exposure to the
news media also plays a role in reinforcing the impact of positive views of the president's handling
of foreign policy. Thus, more than patriotic fervor is involved in rallies. Rather than being a distinctive
phenomenon, a rally event seems to be simply an additional force that pushes potential supporters
over the threshold of approval.
"n June 26, 1993, President Bill Clinton ordered the U.S. navy to launch 23
Tomahawk cruise missiles at Iraq's intelligence headquarters in downtown
Baghdad. The U.S. attack was in response to Iraq's role in a conspiracy to as-
sassinate former President George Bush during a visit to Kuwait. Two hours
later the president went on national television and condemned Saddam Hussein
as ruling "by atrocity" and declared that the Iraqi conspiracy against President
Bush "was an attack against our country and against all Americans."
On June 21 to 24, the CBS News/New York Times Poll interviewed a random
sample of 1,363 adults around the U.S., excluding Alaska and Hawaii. On June
27, 622 of the same respondents were re-interviewed to gauge their reactions to
the attack on Iraq. (A comparison of the composition of the two samples appears
in appendix A.)
Among those interviewed both before and immediately following the missile
attack, general approval of the way President Clinton was handling his job as
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Whitten for their helpful advice.
T H E JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 59, No. 1, February 1997, Pp. 200-12
© 1997 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819
Who Rallies? The Anatomy of a Rally Event 201
president surged from 35% to 47%. Disapproval fell from 50% before the attack
to 45% following it. In all, 24% of nonapprovers on June 21-24 rallied to ap-
proval of Clinton on June 27. Only 11% of the approvers on June 21-24 shifted
to disapproval following the attack.
The missile attack on Iraq is a textbook example of what John Mueller termed
a "rally event." He denned such an event as an incident that relates to inter-
national relations, directly involves the U.S. and particularly the president, and
is specific, dramatic, and sharply focused. Such events confront the nation as a
whole, are salient to the public, and gain public attention and interest (1973, 208-
13).1 The missile attack meets all these conditions, and it precipitated a surge in
public approval of the president. Clearly, a rally occurred.
But who rallied? Although rallies have been the subject of analysis by scholars
for decades (see, for example, Kernell 1978; Lee 1977; MacKuen 1983; Ostrom
and Simon 1985; Sigelman and Conover 1981), most such studies rely on ag-
gregate data, which restricts authors to examining national totals. They cannot
determine who switches from nonapproval of the president to approval in re-
sponse to a rally event. Does every group rally to the same degree? If not, why
do some rally more than others?
In this paper we investigate the anatomy of the rally following President
Clinton's order to attack Iraq's intelligence headquarters. We want to determine
who is rallying and then explain why some are more likely than others to rally.
FRAMEWORK OF INVESTIGATION
The theoretical basis for attributing significance to rally events is that the
public will increase its support of the president in times of crisis or during major
international events, at least in the short run, because he is the symbol of the
country and the primary focus of attention at such times. Moreover, people do
not want to hurt the country's chances of success by opposing the president, and
the president has an opportunity to look masterful and evoke patriotic reactions
among the people.
This theory does not differentiate among groups with different characteristics
or attitudes toward the president and public policy. To answer the question of
who rallies and why they do so, we examine respondents' general predispositions
toward the president, their attitudes in specific policy arenas, and their exposure
to media coverage of the news in a multivariate analysis.
To understand why some people rallied and others did not, we must know
who rallied. Our sample of 622 respondents interviewed both before and after
the U.S. missile attack on Baghdad allows us to identify the specific individuals
'Mueller (1973, 208-13) also included the inaugural period of a president's term as a rally event.
The missile attack also meets the definitions of rally events of Brody (1991, ch. 3) and Kernell (1978,
513). Kernell added the stipulation that the situation must make the front page for at least five
consecutive days.
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who rallied. If we had to rely on two independent cross-sectional polls, we would
not be able to identify the individuals who changed their opinions of the presi-
dent. We would be limited to aggregate analysis, greatly restricting our oppor-
tunity to explore theoretically important individual-level explanations for opinion
change.
Obviously, those who approved of the president before a rally event cannot
"rally." Only those who were nonapprovers may do so. Although some nonap-
provers may become more positive toward the president but remain in the non-
approver category, what counts for political scientists who study rallies, journalists
who report on them, and presidents who benefit from them is the people who
move from nonapproval to approval. Thus, our analysis focuses primarily on
those who were originally nonapprovers and seeks to explain why some of them
rallied. In addition, we take into account the smaller number of respondents who
moved from approval to nonapproval following the rally event.
GENERAL PREDISPOSITIONS TOWARD THE PRESIDENT
The public's predispositions toward the president provide the foundations of
presidential approval and mediate the impact of more volatile influences (Edwards
1990). Since predispositions have such a strong influence on evaluating the pres-
ident, we would expect that respondents' evaluations of the president prior to
the rally event would influence the likelihood of their rallying.
Leadership
One means of determining the impact of general predispositions toward the
president on rallying is to examine the responses to questions focusing on broad
aspects of the public's views of President Clinton. The Leadership Index includes
responses to three questions: evaluations of the president's qualities of leadership,
whether he is up to the job of the presidency, and the degree of trust in his
ability to deal with a wide range of problems. Respondents who rated the pres-
ident poorly on each question received a' — 3, while those who rated him favorably
on each question were coded as +3. The Cronbach's Alpha for the Leadership
Index is .77.2
Party Identification
Evaluations of the president's performance reflect the underlying partisan loy-
alties of the public (Callaghan and Virtanen 1993; Edwards 1990, 117-23). Party
not only directly affects opinions of the president but also. mediates the impact
2
 All the indexes employed in this research that contain three or more variables have been evaluated
by Cronbach's Alpha. Alpha is a measure of the internal consistency of a set of items and ranges
from zero (no internal consistency) to unity (perfect internal consistency). An alpha of .65 or higher
indicates an index has an acceptable level of internal consistency (see Bohrnstedt and Knoke 1988).
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of other influences. Members of the president's party are predisposed to approve
of his performance and members of the opposition party are predisposed to be
less approving. Independents, those without explicit partisan attachments, fall
between the Democrats and Republicans in their levels of approval of the
president.
The average difference in support between Democrats and Republicans over
the past four decades has been nearly 40 percentage points, a very substantial
figure. Independents fall in between, averaging a difference of about 20 percent-
age points from both Democrats and Republicans. Thus, it is reasonable to hy-
pothesize that, in the case of President Clinton, Democrats would be more likely
to rally than Republicans, with Independents falling in between.
Gender
Gender does not represent a general predisposition toward a president, but
there is substantial evidence of attitudes associated with gender that provide a
general predisposition toward the use of force. The results of most studies com-
paring opinion differences of men and women would lead us to expect women
to be considerably less responsive than men to a missile attack. In comparison
with men, women have a greater concern about international conflict (Conover
1988; Conover and Sapiro 1993; Fite, Genesi, and Wilcox 1990; Gilens 1988;
"Women and the Use of Force" 1994). As Page and Shapiro (1992, 295) put it
in their survey of fifty years of public opinion, "in practically all realms of foreign
and domestic policy, women are less belligerent than men. They are . . . more
likely to oppose the use of force" (see also Mueller 1973, 146-147; 1994, 42-43).
POLICY ATTITUDES
Policy attitudes are more specific than the general predispositions we have been
discussing, but they may also create a propensity toward rallying. In this section
we examine two broad and one more focused set of policy attitudes prior to the
rally event and hypothesize on their relation to the probability of rallying.
Four questions compose the Economic Policy Support Index. These include
evaluations of President Clinton's handling of the economy, the fairness of his
economic plan, its probable effects, and the direction of the economy. The po-
tential range of scores for respondents is —4 to +4. The Cronbach's Alpha for
the Economic Policy Support Index is .76.
Five questions compose the Foreign Policy Support Index. These questions
include evaluations of Clinton's handling of foreign policy in general, particularly
that of Yugoslavia and Somalia, and the levels of confidence and trust in his
handling of international crises. The potential range of scores for respondents is
— 5 to +5, depending on their level of approval of the president in the policy
area. The Cronbach's Alpha for the Foreign Policy Support Index is .72.
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Moving to a yet more specific policy, we examine the relationship between
predispositions regarding the use of force and rallying. We might expect support
for the use of force to be an especially important factor in explaining the pro-
clivity toward rallying, because the typical rally event involves the use of force.
Thus, it seems reasonable to predict that those most supportive of the use of
force in the abstract would be most responsive to its use in a particular situation.
The Use of Force Index is composed of responses to two questions eliciting
support for retaliating if UN troops were fired upon in Bosnia and for providing
military assistance in world trouble spots. Respondents were scored from —2 to
+ 2, depending on their level of support for the use of force. The Pearson's r for
the two variables is .30.
For each of the indexes representing policy attitudes, we hypothesize that those
whose attitudes are more positive toward the president, or, in the case of the use
of force, more positive toward the actions the president has taken, will be more
likely to rally.
Opinion Leadership and Media Priming
People do not react only according to preexisting attitudes. They may also be
affected by their exposure to information regarding a potential rally situation.
Brody (1991), for example, has argued that in potential rally events, the public
is especially dependent on information from the press and the public figures the
press interviews. If the balance of elite commentary on the potential rally event
is positive, then the public is more likely to rally behind the president. If it is
negative, then there is less likelihood of a surge in support.
Brody's argument focuses on the overall likelihood of a rally occurring, but
his theorizing applies equally well at the individual level. In the case of the missile
attack on Iraq, media commentary was overwhelmingly positive. Thus, if Brody
is correct, those paying the closest attention to the media should be the most
likely to rally.
Media Priming
The theory of media priming presents a somewhat different view of the impact
of the media. It is premised on the fact that most of the time the cognitive
burdens are too great for people to reach judgments or decisions based on com-
prehensive, integrated information. Thus, the public takes short cuts or cues,
relying heavily on the mass media.
The public's familiarity with political matters is closely related to the amount
and duration of attention these affairs receive in the mass media (Page and
Shapiro 1992, 12-13). The media also have a strong influence on the issues the
public views as important (Cook, Tyler, and Goetz 1983; Graber 1978; Iyengar
and Kinder, 1987; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; MacKuen and Coombs 1981,
ch. 3-4; Portess and McCombs 1991; Winter and Eyal 1981).
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In addition, media coverage of issues increases the importance of these issues
in the public's evaluation of political figures. According to Iyengar (1991, 10),
"The themes and issues that are repeated in television news coverage become
the priorities of viewers. Issues and events highlighted by television news become
especially influential as criteria for evaluating public officials."
Moreover, there is growing evidence that network news helps to provide a
frame of reference for issues, and this affects evaluations of presidents. When
the news began covering the Iran-Contra affair, Ronald Reagan's public approval
took an immediate and severe dip as the public applied new criteria of evaluation
(Iyengar 1991, ch. 8; Krosnick and Kinder 1990). Krosnick and Brannon (1993)
found that the role of assessments of George Bush's economic performance in
overall evaluations of him decreased substantially after the Gulf War began, and
they concluded that media-priming effects caused a shift of attention to his per-
formance on war-related criteria. (See also Iyengar and Simon 1994.)
Experiments found that President Carter's overall reputation and, to a lesser
extent, views of his apparent competency, were affected by network news. The
standards people used in evaluating the president, what they felt was important
in his job performance, seemed to be influenced by the news they watched on
television (Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; see also Bartels 1993).
Thus, there is reason to believe that media coverage may affect the propensity
to rally. The theory of media priming predicts that an occurrence such as the
attack on Baghdad makes opinion relevant to the event more salient in evaluations
of the president. More specifically, it follows that the interaction between expo-
sure to the news and evaluations of the president's handling of foreign policy
should have a significant effect on rallying. Similarly, we would expect that the
interaction between exposure to the news and support for the use of force should
have a significant effect on the propensity to rally.
The Media and Rallying
We lack a question regarding how closely our respondents followed the news
regarding the missile attack on Iraq, but we are fortunate to have five questions
about how closely each respondent followed the news about five other interna-
tional arenas or issues: Japan, Russia, Somalia, Yugoslavia, and the four islands
captured by the Soviet Union from Japan in World War II. Respondents received
a 0,. 1, 2, or 3 on each question, depending on how closely they said they followed
the news regarding each country or issue. The Cronbach's Alpha for the Atten-
tion to the News Index is .73.
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Because our dependent variable, rallying, is a nominal variable, we employ a
logit analysis rather than OLS regression analysis in our multivariate test re-
garding the causes of rallying. The dependent variable is presidential approval
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or nonapproval on June 27, after the attack on Baghdad; and is coded " 1 " for
approval and "0" for nonapproval. Because we are interested in the change
(in either direction) in presidential approval resulting from the rally event, we
control for each respondent's previous evaluation of the president. Thus, our
model also includes a dummy variable for previous presidential approval
(Approval,,).3
The independent variables are the Leadership Index, Party Identification
(Democrats and Independents are dummy variables with Republicans reflected
in the constant term), Gender (coded 1 for female, 0 for male), the Economic
and Foreign Policy Support Indexes, the Use of Force Index, and the Attention
to the News Index. We also include interaction terms for attention to the news
and foreign policy support and attention to the news and use of force. A summary
of the indexes and interaction terms is presented in Appendix B.
The inclusion of the two interaction terms in the model introduces the prob-
lem of multicollinearity. The component parts are highly correlated with their
corresponding interaction terms, which affect the standard errors of the esti-
mates. To correct for this problem, we rescaled the component variables through
a procedure called centering (see Aiken and West 1991). By subtracting the var-
iable's mean from each observation, the Foreign Policy Support, Use of Force,
and Attention to the News indexes were transformed and are no longer highly
correlated with their interaction terms.
Our findings are presented in Table 1. The parameter estimates represent the
predicted marginal effect on the log-odds ratio that results from a change in one
unit of an independent variable while the other independent variables are held
at their means or modal categories.
Party identification, evaluations of presidential leadership, and support for the
president's economic and foreign policies are statistically significant predictors of
the likelihood a respondent would rally. Contrary to our expectations, the impact
of gender and support for the use of force do not pass the tests of statistical
significance.
Exposure to the news itself also does not affect the likelihood of rallying. There
is evidence of the priming effects of the media, however. The interaction of
attention to the news and evaluations of the president's handling of foreign policy
has a statistically significant influence on rallying. The interaction between at-
tention to the news and general support for the use of force does not have such
an effect, reflecting the lack of independent impact of either component of the
interaction term on rallying.
An examination of the parameter estimates in Table 1 shows the statistical
significance of particular explanatory variables, but to understand the strength of
The inclusion of APPROVAL,i as an independent variable introduces the potential for bias and
inconsistency in the estimators because the errors could become autocorrelated. We tested for bias
and inconsistency and found no significant effects. We are confident that our estimators are robust.
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TABLE 1
LOGIT MODEL OF THE CLINTON RALLY
Variable
Constant
Leadership
Democrat
Independent
Gender
Economic Policy
Foreign Policy
Use of Force
Attention To News
News*Foreign Policy
News*Use of Force
Approval,!
Parameter
Estimates
-1.015
.378
.632
.609
.006
.164
.185
-.067
-.009
.036
-.050
1.404
Std. Error
.266
.080
.301
.304
.253
.067
.055
.087
.046
.018
.032
.304
Sig. Level
.000
.000
.036
.045
.981
.014
.001
.441
.838
.046
.116
.000
Log-likelihood ratio: 450.978
Significance level: .001
Cases correctly predicted = 84.7%
Improvement over the modal category = 31.3%
Proportion in modal category = 53.4%
N = 622
the significant variables, we need to use the estimates to derive the probabilities
of a person's rallying. The probabilities of rallying are constructed holding the
indexes and interaction terms at their means, the approval dummy variable at
zero, and the other variables at their modal categories.4 The high and low prob-
abilities of the indexes are calculated by using the end points of the scales. These
probabilities are shown in Table 2.
Democrats are much more likely than Republicans to rally, with Independents
falling in between. There is also a direct relationship between holding positive
views of the president's leadership qualities and policy stewardship and rallying.
Those who gave high marks to Clinton's leadership and handling of economic
and foreign policy but who did not approve of his overall performance as
president before the missile attack are much more likely to rally than those with
low evaluations. Finally, exposure to the' media substantially increases the prob-
ability that those with positive evaluations of the president's handling of foreign
policy will rally. Consistent with the theory of media priming, foreign policy
4
 In order to measure the substantive impact of party identification on the probability of rallying
for the average Democrat, Independent, and Republican, the probabilities are calculated using the
means of the partisan group rather than the overall sample mean. Employing the overall sample
means blurs the differences between party groups.
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TABLE 2
PROBABILITIES OF RALLYING*
Variable
Party Identification
Democrats
Independents
Republicans
Leadership Index
High
Low
Economic Policy Index
High
Low
Foreign Policy Index
High
Low
News*Foreign Policy
High
Low
Probability of Rallying
.650
.352
.126
.505
.096
.426
.166
.451
.115
.536
.075
"constructed from table 1 and appendix B.
performance becomes more important in overall evaluations of the president fol-
lowing a rally event.
CONCLUSION
We began by asking "Who rallies"? The answer seems to be straightforward:
those most disposed to support the president in the first place. In the case of
Bill Clinton, that means Democrats, those who have favorable opinions of his
leadership, and those who agree with his policies. In addition, exposure to the
news media plays a role in reinforcing the impact of positive views of the pres-
ident's handling of foreign policy.
Thus, more than patriotic fervor is involved in rallies. Although Americans
may increase their approval of the president following a policy success, they show
little disposition toward rallying to support the president for its own sake. Instead,
those who rally are also those who have the lowest thresholds to overcome to
move to approval of the president. Predispositions toward supporting the presi-
dent are important in mediating the effects of a rally event. Party identification
is especially significant, which is not surprising, given the role of party identifi-
cation in orienting most Americans toward political life. Rather than being a
distinctive phenomenon, a rally event seems to be an additional force that pushes
potential supporters over the threshold of approval.
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Moreover, media priming seems to influence Americans' evaluations of the
president's actions in a rally event. People with positive evaluations of President
Clinton's handling of foreign policy were more likely to rally if they were more
exposed to the media and, by implication, primed by the media's coverage of the
U.S. missile attack on Baghdad.
Aside from understanding who rallies, our findings have broader implications
for governing. Several authors (James and O'Neal 1991; Morgan and Bickers
1992; Ostrom and Job 1986) have argued that presidents may engage in a cynical
ploy for public support, employing the use of force abroad to rally the public
and divert its attention from domestic problems.
We have found that the president's strongest critics are not readily distracted
by the drama of a rally event. Those who do rally are those least critical of the
president. Thus, it is not surprising that most potential rally events do not pro-
duce rallies at all (Edwards 1990, 143-52). Instead, the polls taken after most of
them show a loss of support.
On the other hand, our findings do provide some support for Morgan and
Bickers' (1992) reformulation of the argument regarding the use of force to rally
the public. They found that presidents are more likely to use force in foreign
policy when they are low in approval among their own partisans. As we have
seen, these are exactly those who are most likely to rally.
We have examined only one rally event, of course, and it is possible that it is
atypical. Perhaps a president who enjoyed a higher level of trust among the public
would attract more ralliers (only 35% of the sample trusted President Clinton's
ability to deal wisely with difficult international crises). We cannot say until we
study yet other such events. We do believe, however, that we have taken a sig-
nificant step toward answering the question "Who rallies?"
Manuscript submitted 12 May 1995
Final manuscript received 17 January 1996
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APPENDIX A
COMPARISON OF BEFORE AND AFTER SURVEY SAMPLES
Category
Gender
Male
Female
Race
White
Nonwhite
Age
18 to 29
30 to 44
45 to 64
Over 64
Income
Under 815,000
SI5 to 30,000
$30 to 50,000
$50 to 75,000
Over $75,000
Party identification
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Education
Some high-school
High-school graduate
Some college
College graduate
June 21-24
%
46
54
86
14
19
37
28
16
12
27
33
15
9
35
28
33
10
35
26
28
APPENDIX B
INDEX SUMMARY
Index
Leadership
Economic Policy
Centered Foreign Policy
Centered Use of Force
Centered Attention to News
Centered News'Foreign Policy
Centered News»Use of Force
Sample Mean
0.191
-0.513
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.036
-0.050
June 27
%
47
53
90
10
16
36
29
20
14
28
31
13
10
36
28
32
10
34
27
29
Range
-3 to 3
-4 to 4
-5.429 to 4.571
-2.680 to 1.320
-7.580 to 7.420
-40.283 to 33.913
-17.205 to 14.956
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